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Abstract

In a market where some traders are rational (maximize expected utility) and others
are systematically biased (deviate from expected utility due to some bias parameter,
θ ), do equilibrium prices necessarily depend on θ ? In this note, focusing on the case
where there is an aggregate and systematic bias in the population, we show that market
prices can still be unbiased. Hence, we establish that systematically biased agents do
not necessarily imply biased market prices. We show that the parametric model we
use also predicts observed deviations from expected utility in laboratory and market
environments.
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Introduction

The expected utility (EU) model has been the workhorse of economic analysis since it
was axiomatized by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern over seventy years ago.1
It was swiftly applied to decisions involving insurance (Friedman and Savage, 1948), the
existence of mixed strategy equilibria in non-cooperative games (Nash 1950a, 1951), cooperative bargaining theory (Nash, 1950b) and optimal portfolio selection (Tobin 1958;
Markowitz, 1959). With the rise of information economics, EU became the micro foundation for analyzing games, markets, and contracts under asymmetric information. With the
rise of modern finance, EU became the micro foundation of equilibrium asset pricing theory. It has penetrated the barriers into neighboring disciplines, finding application in fields
as diverse as political science, evolutionary biology, and sociology. Even one of its greatest
critics has referred to EU as “the most important theory in the social sciences” (Kahneman
2011, p. 270).
Despite its widespread adoption in economics and its normative basis as a model of
rational choice, EU has been subject to persistent empirical challenges. Four of the most
robust and systematic empirical violations of EU are (i) the Allais paradox, (ii) the common
ratio effect (both identified by Allais, 1953), (iii) loss aversion (e.g., aversion to small mixed
gambles) as defined by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and (iv) aversion to ambiguity (e.g.,
as defined by Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002).
In addition to these and other empirical limitations of EU in laboratory experiments, EU
also fails to capture some features of decision making in the ‘real world’. For instance, under EU, consumers would not find it optimal to purchase full insurance at actuarially unfair
prices (Blavatskyy, 2014), contrary to the large premiums many people are willing to pay
to eliminate risk. Sydnor (2010) found that risk aversion under EU is unable to explain
individual insurance decisions for moderate risks. In portfolio choice, the EU model is unable to explain why many households do not invest in stocks, despite the historically large
average return on equities. In financial markets, buying and selling price gaps in markets
cannot be explained by EU (Dow and Werlang, 1992), and the standard consumption-based
capital asset pricing model with EU preferences falls victim to the equity premium puzzle
(Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Chateauneuf et al., 2007) and other asset pricing anomalies.
1 See

Bleichrodt et al. (2016) for the conclusion that John Nash and Jacob Marschak were the first to
provide a complete axiomatization of EU in their 1950 papers in the same issue of Econometrica (Marschak
1950; Nash 1950b).
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In this note, we first establish that a one-parameter extension of EU in which a decision
maker exhibits ‘security bias’ – a disproportionate preference for lotteries with higher minimum outcomes, provides a unified explanation for the experimental evidence (the Allais
paradox, common ratio effect, loss aversion, and preference for robustness to ambiguity) as
well as for the empirical challenges to EU in insurance markets and portfolio choice noted
above. We do so by transforming individual (rather than cumulative) probabilities. As a
consequence, our approach provides a clean comparison to the standard predictions of EU.
As our main result, we embed this model of security-biased agents into a market with
Arrow securities and prove a ’bias aggregation theorem’ which demonstrates that a market with systematically biased agents can aggregate investor biases and produce unbiased
market-level prices. That such a formal result is possible has not been clear even though it
has long been argued by neoclassical economists that markets can eliminate investor biases
and it has been argued by behavioral economists that markets cannot do so (Thaler, 2015).
To motivate the model of security bias, we note that despite a half-century of experimental and theoretical work on choice under risk, the standard generalization of EU that
incorporates systematically biased agents has not yet been established. In a recent paper,
O’Donoghue and Somerville (2018) summarize three promising approaches to modeling
risk aversion in economics – loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Koszegi and
Rabin, 2006, 2007), probability weighting (Quiggin, 1982), and salience theory (Bordalo
et al., 2012). The Koszegi-Rabin approach to loss aversion has become popular in recent years, although it makes a strong assumption that people have rational expectations
regarding the reference point. It also violates stochastic dominance for a loss aversion parameter greater than 2. Salience theory is a powerful framework for analyzing behavior
although it violates transitivity in general and it violates stochastic dominance when lottery
outcomes are correlated (Bordalo et al., p.1259). The approach by Quiggin avoids violations of stochastic dominance, but models of rank-dependent probability weighting have
not proved very tractable in economic analysis as they transform cumulative rather than
individual probabilities. Yet doing so seemed necessary - as O’Donoghue and Somerville
(2018) note, “While early formulations applied the probability weighting function to the
probability of each outcome, this approach generates violations of dominance.” (p.102).
Given the preceding discussion, one might ask whether there is an alternative approach
to modeling risk aversion that avoids the limitations of the three approaches noted above.
We argue that the answer to this question appears to be ‘yes’ and the resulting model appears to be one of ‘quasi-rank dependent’ utility (QRD), which can be viewed as a natural
2

risky-choice analog to quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997). The QRD model formalizes ‘security bias’, it satisfies basic axioms of rational choice such as transitivity and
stochastic dominance, and it is simpler than standard rank-dependent probability weighting
models (Quiggin, 1982) since it transforms individual rather than cumulative probabilities.
This observation may be surprising since it is widely believed that models which transform
individual probabilities necessarily violate stochastic dominance or transitivity (Diecidue
et al., 2004; Dhami, 2016; O’Donoghue and Somerville, 2018).
In addition to accommodating observed empirical patterns, there is the related issue that
some models have more empirical content than others in terms of generating precise predictions. For instance, Harless and Camerer (1994) comment, “Some theories, like EU...are
too lean: They could explain the data better by allowing a few more common patterns.
Other theories, such as mixed fanning and rank-dependent EU, are too fat: They allow a lot
of patterns which are rarely observed.” (p. 1285). The QRD model provides a compromise
between EU and rank dependent utility (RDU): It allows for a few more commonly observed patterns that are not explained by EU (such as the Allais paradox and common ratio
effect), while generating unambiguous comparative static predictions. The QRD model is a
special case of the non-extreme outcome expected utility (NEO-EU) model (Schmidt 2000;
Chateauneuf et al., 2007; Webb and Zank 2011). It is, perhaps the simplest generalization
of EU that preserves transitivity, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion.
We present the QRD model in section 2, study behavioral implications in section 3, and
study market implications in sections 4, 5, and 6. Proofs of propositions 1 through 5 are in
the appendix. Propositions 6, 7, and 8 are proved in the main text.

2

Quasi-Rank Dependent Utility Theory

Let X ⊂ R denote a finite set of outcomes. A lottery, f , is a probability distribution on X.
Denote the set of lotteries by ∆(X). Consider model (1) where f is the minimum outcome
in the support of f , U (f ) =∑x∈X f (x)u(x) and θ ∈ [0, 1] :
V (f ) = θ U(f ) + (1 − θ )u(f ).

(1)

Model (1) takes the convex combination of the expected utility and the minimum utility
of the lottery and can be interpreted as a disproportionate preference for lotteries with larger
minimum payoffs. We refer to this behavior as ‘security bias’ since lotteries with higher
minimum payoffs offer greater ‘security’ to the decision maker by limiting the worst-case
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scenario. Security bias can be quantified by 1 − θ . We show that security bias offers a
unified explanation for the certainty effect (the Allais paradox and common ratio effect)
and loss aversion (aversion to symmetric small mixed gambles) for choices under risk (in
Section 3). If probabilities are subjective, security bias can also reflect a preference for
robustness to mis-specified beliefs, and it reduces to Wald’s (1950) maximin rule when
θ = 0, which is widely used in robust decision making under uncertainty. When precise
probabilities of events are unknown, the parameter θ can be interpreted as the decision
maker’s degree of confidence in his beliefs. If the decision maker is fully confident in
his beliefs, then θ = 1, and the decision maker maximizes subjective expected utility with
respect to those beliefs. If the decision maker is completely uncertain of what to believe,
then θ = 0, and the decision maker chooses the alternative that is most robust to different
specifications of beliefs. In the intermediate case where θ ∈(0,1) the decision maker cares
about both maximizing EU and maximizing robustness. If probabilities are subjective, (1)
satisfies the definition of ambiguity aversion from Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
Security bias also drives behavior in strategic situations. For instance, Chong et al.
(2016) find strong support for what they call ‘minimum aversion’ (a tendency to avoid
strategies that might yield a player her lowest possible payoff) in a large set of experimental normal form games. Other behavioral interpretations for (1) are that a decision maker
overweights the worst outcome of a lottery because it is salient or because it represents
the most the decision maker can be guaranteed from that lottery with certainty, or because
the decision maker is pessimistic or ‘expects the worse’. An axiomatic foundation for (1)
is given by Webb and Zank (2011). A variant of model (1) appeared in Ellsberg (1961)
which Ellsberg proposed as a simple generalization of subjective expected utilty theory (p.
664) in the same paper in which he introduced his classic paradox. A different variant of
(1) was introduced in Gilboa (1988), and (1) first appeared explicitly in Schmidt (2000).
An analogous model to (1) for decisions under ambiguity was characterized in Kopylov
(2009). Model (1) also appears as a special case of the models in Chateauneuf et al. (2007)
and Webb and Zank (2011) which allow for both optimistic and pessimistic behavior. However, despite the simplicity of (1) and its convenient properties, it has received relatively
little attention in applications compared to RDU and cumulative prospect theory (CPT) due
to (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
We note that (1) has an equivalent representation as a model of quasi-rank dependent
utility. Let Xf denote the random variable induced by lottery f . Let % denote a preference
relation on ∆(X), with strict preference and indifference represented by  and ∼.
4

Definition 1 (Quasi-Rank Dependent Utility) In Quasi-Rank Dependent (QRD) utility theory, there exists utility function, u, probability weighting function, π, with π(0) = 0, π(1) = 1,
and ∑x∈X π(f (x)) = 1, and a unique parameter, θ ∈ [0, 1], such that for any f , g ∈∆(X), f %
g if and only if V(f ) ≥ V(g), where for all x in the support of f :
V(f ) =

∑ π(f (x))u(x),

(2)

x∈X


 1 − θ + θ f (x), P(X < x) = 0.
f
π(f (x)) =

θ f (x), P(X f < x) > 0.

(3)

where u is a strictly increasing utility function and P(Xf ≤ x) is the cumulative distribution
function of Xf .
Note that the weights sum to 1. Somewhat surprisingly, the simple probability weighting function in (3) has not yet appeared in the literature. The formula in Definition 1 is a
tractable “quasi-rank-dependent” probability weighting model which satisfies both stochastic dominance and transitivity and which transforms individual rather than cumulative probabilities. In addition, it is straightforward to test expected utility theory in this setup by
testing if θ = 1. This approach is ‘quasi-rank-dependent’ since the weight is different for
the probability of the lowest ranked outcome, but the probabilities of all other outcomes
receive the same weight. For further intuition, consider an analogy to choice over time.
Note that (2-3) is somewhat analogous to the model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (4-5)
which has discount function d(t), and consumption stream (x0 , x1 , ..., xT ) is evaluated as
(4) where β ∈ [0, 1]. We suggest that the quasi-rank dependent model in (2-3) may be a
convenient compromise between expected utility and rank-dependent utility, analogous to
how the quasi-hyperbolic model in (4-5) is a convenient compromise between discounted
utility and hyperbolic discounting.
W (x0 , x1 , ..., xT ) = ∑ d(t)u(xt )

(4)

t


 1 t =0
d(t) =
.
 βδt t > 0

5

(5)

2.1

Certainty Preference or Security Bias?

Previous work has led to the impression that the analog to quasi-hyperbolic discounting under risk is a model of ‘certainty preference’ with weights assigned to probabilities
depending on whether f (x) = 1 or f (x) < 1. However, such models necessarily violate either stochastic dominance or transitivity (e.g., Diecidue et al., 2004), two of the most basic
rationality axioms for choice under risk, which are rarely violated in experiments (e.g.,
Blavatskyy (2010), Regenwetter et al. (2011) and Baillon et al. (2014)). Upon closer
inspection, however, it seems such models do not capture certainty preference in an intuitive way: They allow for situations where a guaranteed payoff x is preferred to a 50-50
chance of gaining y > x or x, merely because the former is certain. It seems plausible in
such cases that certainty is better viewed as the minimum guarantee of a lottery: While the
certain outcome guarantees x, the lottery guarantees at least x. This suggests that a more
natural model of certainty preference assigns different weights to the probability of x if
P(Xf ≥ x) <1 versus if P(Xf ≥ x) =1 (the lottery guarantees at least x), as implied by (2).
It also appears that models which assign different weights to probabilities depending on
whether f (x)= 1 or f (x) < 1 do not capture the behavior of most subjects who exhibit the
Allais paradox. For instance, Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher (2016) conducted a novel test
of Allais-style violations of EU in which they replaced the common consequence across a
series of six decisions. Their subjects chose between safe lottery ($c, 0.89; $8, 0.10; $8,
0.01) and risky lottery ($c, 0.89; $10, 0.10; $0, 0.01) for c∈{0, 5, 8, 10, 16, 20}. Let R
denote a ‘risky’ choice and S denote a ‘safe’ choice. Ordering the six choices from those
with the lowest value of c to the highest value of c, only the preference patterns RRRRRR
and SSSSSS are consistent with EU. The classic Allais paradox corresponds to the case
where the first letter in the sequence is R (where c = 0) and the third letter is S (where c
= 8). Models which assign different weights to certain and uncertain outcomes predict a
‘certainty effect’ pattern of RRSRRR but not the ‘zero effect’ pattern RSSSSS. In contrast,
QRD is consistent with a ‘zero effect’ pattern RSSSSS, but not with a certainty effect pattern. The standard RDU model permits the zero effect pattern, the certainty effect pattern,
and the reverse of each pattern, and so is not very helpful in predicting which effect will
dominate. Consistent with the predictions of QRD, Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher (2016)
observed strong support for the zero effect pattern while none of their subjects exhibited
the certainty effect pattern.

6

3

Behavioral Implications
We next explore behavioral implications of the QRD model.

3.1

Loss Aversion

A basic property of observed behavior under risk is loss aversion which has been defined
behaviorally by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Schmidt and Zank (2005) as aversion
to 50-50 gain-loss bets: Given a choice between lotteries f and g where f := (y,0.5; −y,0.5)
and g := (x,0.5; −x, 0.5), for any x > y ≥ 0, loss aversion holds if f  g.
Proposition 1 Let a decision maker have QRD preferences with u(x) = x. Then loss aversion holds if and only if θ ∈ [0, 1).

3.2

Rabin’s Paradox

Rabin (2000) proved a calibration theorem which implies, for instance, that an EU maximizer who rejects a 50-50 bet to lose $100 or win $125 at all wealth levels will also reject
a 50-50 bet to lose $600 or win $1 million, an implausible level of risk aversion.
Under the QRD model, the 50-50 lose $100, gain $125 bet is rejected at all wealth
levels, w > $100, if u(w) > (1 − θ /2)u(w − 100) + (θ /2)u(w+125) for all w > $100. If u
is strictly concave, it follows that
u((1 − θ /2)(w − 100) + (θ /2)(w + 125)) > (1 − θ /2)u(w − 100) + (θ /2)u(w + 125)
for all θ ∈ (0, 1). Also note that for any θ ∈ (0, 8/9) and any we have:
u(w) > u((1 − θ /2)(w − 100) + (θ /2)(w + 125)).
Thus, for any strictly concave utility function, a QRD agent with θ ∈ (0, 8/9) will reject Rabin’s small stakes gamble at any wealth level, w > $100. Next, consider the 50-50
gamble to lose $600 or gain $z. The gamble is accepted at current wealth level, w, if
(θ /2)u(w + z) + (1 − θ /2)u(w−600) > u(w). Acceptance of the gamble also implies that:
u(w + z(θ /2) − 600(1 − θ /2)) > u(w),
which implies θ > 1200/(600 + z). Under the preceding restrictions on θ , a QRD agent
may reject the small stakes gamble at all wealth levels and choose the gamble with a 50-50
chance of losing $600 or gaining $z for sufficiently large z.
7

3.3

The Common Ratio Effect

In the following analysis, we provide general conditions on θ which explains the common ratio (at certainty), a robust violation of the independence axiom of EU.
Definition 2 Consider lotteries f := (y,1), f 0 := (y, q; 0, 1 − q), g := (x, p; 0, 1 − p),
and g0 := (x, qp; 0, 1 − qp), for any y ∈ (0, x) and p, q ∈ (0, 1). The common ratio effect
holds if f ∼ g implies f 0 ≺ g0 .
Proposition 2 Let u(0) = 0. For a decision maker with QRD preferences, the common
ratio effect holds if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
In the classic version of the common ratio effect due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
(x, y, p, q) = ($4000, $3000, 0.80, 0.25). Definition 2 implies that an agent who is indifferent between lotteries f and g will strictly prefer g0 over f 0 .

3.4

The Allais Paradox

A different violation the EU independence axiom, the Allais paradox (the common consequence effect) due to Allais (1953), is defined as:
Definition 3 Define lotteries f := (y,1), f 0 := (y, q; 0, 1 − q), g := (x, p; y,1 − q; 0, q − p),
and g0 := (x, p; 0, 1 − p), for any y ∈ (0, x) and p,q ∈(0, 1). The Allais paradox holds if
f ∼ g implies f 0 ≺ g0 .
Proposition 3 Let u(0) = 0. For a decision maker with QRD preferences, the Allais paradox holds if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
While the Allais paradox is observed at the large stakes of Allais (1953) where (x, y, p, q) =
($5 million, $1 million, 0.10, 0.11) and at the stakes used by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), where (x, y, p, q) = ($2500, $2400, 0.33, 0.34), the paradox is greatly diminished
at small stakes. In particular, when payoffs are scaled down to (x, y, p, q) = ($100, $20,
0.10, 0.11) as in Fan (2002), or to (x, y, p, q) = ($25, $5, 0.10, 0.11), as in Huck and Muller
(2012), experimental subjects typically choose the riskier lottery in both choices. There
is a strong intuitive basis for not observing the paradox at these small stakes: People are
naturally willing to accept the 1% chance of receiving $0 in exchange for a 10% chance
of receiving $100. A more complete explanation of the Allais paradox should predict the
paradox at the large stakes observed by Allais, and Kahneman and Tversky, but should
predict behavior consistent with EU at the smaller stakes used by Fan (2002) and Huck
8

and Muller (2012). The standard version of CPT with a power value function defined
over gains and losses cannot account for this aggregate pattern even given any probability
weighting function. However, QRD naturally accommodates all four cases. For example,
if u(w + x) = ln (w + x), for an agent with current wealth w = $100,000, and θ = 0.9, then
QRD predicts the Allais paradox to be observed for the examples by Allais (1953) and
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and predicts behavior consistent with EU (the choice of
the two riskier options) for the examples from Fan (2002) and Huck and Muller (2012).

4

Application to Insurance Markets

For decisions under risk, an important implication of quasi-rank dependent probability
weighting is that a decision maker will pay a disproportionately higher premium for risk
elimination than for an equivalent degree of risk reduction that does not eliminate the risk.
This prediction also has empirical support. For instance, Botzen et al. (2013) find that
households place a substantial premium on policies to eliminate flood risk relative to other
opportunities which merely reduce the risk. A similar conclusion was reached by Viscusi
et al. (2014) who found there to be a greater premium for policies that reduce cancer risks
to zero relative to policies which reduce but do not eliminate the risk. We illustrate this
preference for risk elimination in the context of insurance.

4.1

The Decision to Purchase Regular Insurance

Consider the following situation described by Blavatskyy (2018): A decision maker has
a risk of losing D dollars with probability q ∈ (0, 1). The decision maker has the option
of purchasing x ∈ [0,D] units of insurance, where one unit of insurance costs c dollars,
with c ∈ (0, 1), and pays the decision maker one dollar if the loss occurs. We consider
the optimality of purchasing regular (full) insurance (i.e., the case where x = D) under the
QRD model. Formally, we have the following result:
Proposition 4 For any θ ∈ (0, 1), and any concave u, a consumer with QRD preferences
finds it optimal to purchase full insurance at an actuarially unfair price c > q if (6) holds:
1 − θ + θ q ≥ c.

(6)

Under EU, θ = 1 and full insurance is optimal when q ≥ c. That is, a risk-averse EU
agent will not purchase full insurance at an actuarially unfair price. In contrast, Proposition
4 implies that a QRD agent will do so if the weight the agent places on the loss, 1 − θ + θ q,
exceeds the cost per unit of insurance, c.
9

4.2

Over-insurance of Moderate Risks

The QRD model also provides a plausible explanation for the tendency to over-insure
moderate risks, such as paying for highly priced extended warranties on consumer products.
To illustrate overinsurance of moderate risks, consider the finding from Sydnor (2010) from
data on real insurance purchases that customers with a 4 percent probability of a loss were
willing to pay $95 to lower the deductible from $1,000 to $500. In particular, under EU,
for a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function with coefficient of relative risk
aversion, r, Sydnor estimated a lower bound of r >1, 839 for customers who purchased the
insurance contract with the $500 deductible. This estimate is far above plausible levels of
relative risk aversion (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002). However, the majority of new customers
in Sydnor’s study purchased this contract.
The QRD model provides a simple explanation for Sydnor’s finding. Let p denote the
price of insurance with a $1,000 deductible, and let w denote the consumer’s initial wealth.
For simplicity and to isolate the role of security bias, let u(x) = x. Then a QRD consumer
prefers to pay $95 to lower the deductible from $1,000 to $500 for all θ <0.84375. That is,
under QRD, even a consumer with linear utility will purchase the contract with the $500
deductible for a wide range of parameter values (any θ ∈ (0, 0.84375)).

5

Application to Portfolio Choice

Consider a simple application to portfolio choice. There is a set, S, of possible states.
Let qs be the probability of state s. There is a safe asset that pays $0 in each state and a
risky asset, R, that yields return rs in state s, with minimum return rs < 0. A QRD agent
with wealth w, chooses an amount x to invest in the risky asset to maximize (7):
V (R) = θ ∑ qs u(w + xrs ) + (1 − θ )u(w + xrs ).

(7)

s∈S

An EU maximizer (θ = 1) will invest a positive amount in the risky asset if it has a
positive expected return regardless of the agent’s degree of risk aversion. This implication
is contrary to the finding that many households have limited or no participation in the stock
market (e.g., Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991). The QRD model provides an explanation for this
limited stock market participation. Formally:
Proposition 5 For any θ ∈ (0, 1), and any concave u, there is always sufficiently small
ε > 0 such that an investor with QRD preferences will find it optimal to not invest in a risky
asset, R, with expected return E[R] = ε and minimum return rs < 0.
10

6

Bias Aggregation

Having shown that biases do matter in individual insurance and portfolio decisions, we
now show that systematic biases do not necessarily affect market level prices. We consider
a market for Arrow securities which pay $1 if a target event occurs and $0 otherwise. There
are m traders, j = 1, ..., m, of whom n < m are buyers and m − n are sellers. There is heterogeneity in beliefs, where trader j believes the target event will occur with probability qj .
Wealth, w, is assumed to be independent of beliefs. Beliefs are drawn from a distribution
F(q). Traders are price-takers and pursue trading strategies which maximize their preferences. We assume that preferences are given by the QRD model. Traders are risk-averse
with log utility. We first assume traders have the same bias parameter θ (with degree of
bias given by θ̂ = 1 − θ ). We later relax this assumption to allow for heterogeneity in the
degree of bias. Let p denote the price of the security and let xj denote the quantity of the
security purchased by trader j, for j = 1, ..., n. Let yj denote the quantity of the security sold
by trader j, for j = n + 1, ..., m. Buyers of the security solve (8):
max V j = θ q j ln (w + xj (1 − p)) + (1 − θ + θ (1 − qj )) ln (w − xj p)
xj

(8)

for j = 1, ..., n. Sellers of the security solve a similar maximization problem:
max V j = (1 − θ + θ qj ) ln (w − yj (1 − p)) + θ (1 − qj ) ln (w + yj p)
yj

(9)

for j = n + 1, ..., m.The optimal quantity, xj∗ , demanded by buyer j = 1, ..., n and the optimal quantity, y∗j , offered by seller j = n + 1, ...,m are given by:
θ qj − p
,
p(1 − p)

(10)

θ (1 − qj ) − (1 − p)
.
p(1−p)

(11)

xj∗ = w
y∗j = w

From the formulas for xj∗ and y∗j ,a buyer j0 s demand is positive if θ qj − p > 0 and seller
j0 s supply is positive if θ (1 − qj ) − (1 − p) > 0. In equilibrium, supply equals demand.
Z 1+ p − 1
θ θ
−∞

θ (1 − q) − (1 − p)
w
f (q)dq =
p(1 − p)

Z ∞
p
θ

w

θq− p
f (q)dq.
p(1 − p)

From (12), we see that buying-selling price gaps will exist in equilibrium.
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(12)

Proposition 6 Buying-selling price gaps exist in equilibrium: For QRD preferences, a
trader with belief q will buy if and only if p < θ q and will sell if and only if p > θ q + 1 − θ .
A similar finding was derived by Dow and Werlang (1992) in the context of portfolio
choice.2
Note that when θ = 1 (i.e., under EU preferences), there are no buying-selling price gaps:
A trader with belief q will buy the security when p < q and will sell when p > q. Also note
that the size of the buying-selling price gap is equal to the degree of security bias (1 − θ ).
For θ < 1, security bias results in an efficiency loss: A buyer with belief q, could earn a
positive subjective expected payoff by trading for all q ∈ (p, θp ) and a seller with belief q
could earn a positive subjective expected payoff by trading for all q ∈(1 + θp − θ1 , p). Yet no
trade takes place for agents with q ∈ (1 + θp − θ1 , θp ). In an extreme case, if security bias is
sufficiently strong, it can even lead to market failure. For instance, if p = 0.5 and θ = 0.5,
then no trade occurs for any beliefs q ∈ (0, 1), even though welfare-enhancing trade could
occur for all buyers with q > p and all sllers with q < p. For a less extreme example, if
p = 0.5 and θ = 0.9, then no trade occurs for beliefs q ∈ ( 49 , 59 ).
If wealth is independent of beliefs, the equilibrium price under (12) is:
(1 − θ )
p=

R 1+ θp − θ1
−∞


f (q)dq + θ
R 1+ θp − θ1
−∞

R 1+ θp − θ1
−∞

f (q)dq +

R∞
p
θ

q f (q)dq +

R∞
p
θ


q f (q)dq
.

f (q)dq

To consider the impact of security bias on market prices, let q denote the average belief
R∞
across the entire population of traders3 (i.e., q = −∞
q f (q)dq).
Definition 4 The equilibrium market price, p, is unbiased if p = q.
Gjerstand (2005) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) show that in the EU case (i.e., when
θ = 1), market prices are unbiased. A natural question is whether prices can be unbiased
2 Dow

and Werlang (1992) demonstrated that buying-selling price gaps for assets in financial markets
hold under the more general Choquet Expected Utility preferences. The model of Bordalo et al. (2012a)
generates buying-selling price gaps in the context of salience-based consumer choice.
3 One could alternatively define q as the average belief across all traders whose demand or supply functions are positive. The conclusions in Propositions 7 and 8 continue to hold under this alternative specification
of q.
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despite the systematic security bias of market participants (for θ < 1). That is, do equilibrium prices necessarily depend on θ if traders have preferences that depend on θ ? We offer
a simple bias aggregation theorem:
Proposition 7 Suppose buyers and sellers maximize (8) and (9), respectively, and that
supply and demand are each positive. If beliefs across agents are uniformly distributed
on [0, 1], then equilibrium market level prices wil be unbiased (p = q) for any systematic
individual level bias θ ∈ (0.5, 1].
The restriction θ ∈ (0.5, 1] is necessary for supply and demand to each be positive.4
Given our assumption that wealth is independent of beliefs, if f (q) is uniform on [0,1], and
supply and demand are positive, then (12) becomes:
w
p(1 − p)

Z 1+ p − 1
θ θ
0

w
(θ (1 − q) − (1 − p))dq =
p(1 − p)

Z 1
p
θ

(θ q − p)dq.

The equilibrium price is the price p that solves (p + θ − 1)2 = (p − θ )2 , yielding:
1 − 2θ
1
= = q.
2 − 4θ
2
Although simple, Proposition 7 is a surprising result - aggregating preferences of systematically biased agents produces unbiased market level prices!
A primary finding in behavioral economics is that biases are systematic. Thus, they will
not cancel out as noise in ways that random errors might. In contrast, many economists
argue that biases will be eliminated by the market. In his book, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics, Thaler (2015) writes: “I call this argument the invisible
handwave. . . The vague argument is that markets somehow discipline people who are misbehaving. Handwaving is a must because there is no logical way to arrive at a conclusion
that markets transform people into rational agents.” Interestingly, Proposition 7 considers
the case where biases are systematic in the same direction (in a manner consistent with
the Allais paradox, and loss aversion) and shows that even if all agents in a market are
systematically biased, equilibrium prices can accurately aggregate beliefs and produce the
same prices as-if all agents maximized expected utility. Proposition 7 does not mean that
biases do not affect market prices in general. The result is restrictive, particularly given the
p=

4 Given that beliefs are uniformly distributed over [0,1], the restriction that supply and demand are positive
implies that [1 + θp − θ1 , θp ] ⊂ [0, 1] or, equivalently, that 1 − θ < p < θ .
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uniform assumption for beliefs and the assumption that traders have the same risk aversion
and bias (although one might view this as a representative agent).
To push Proposition 7 a little further, suppose that in addition to heterogeneity in subjective beliefs, qj , there is also heterogeneity in the bias parameter, θj . Let θ̂ j := 1 − θ j
denote the degree of security bias for agent j. Hence, an unbiased agent has θ̂ j = 0 and so
maximizes expected utility. To allow for heterogeneity in security bias, suppose that θj is
uniformly distributed over [k,1],where k ∈ (0.5, 1). The restriction that k > 0.5 ensures that
the supply and demand functions are positive for all agents. Note that this heterogeneity
in biases does not average over agents who have security bias and agents who have the
’reverse’ bias. All agents still have systematic security bias (e.g., they all exhibit the Allais
paradox and the common ratio effect, except for agents with θ̂ j = 0 who exhibit no bias).
Hence, the ’average’ bias in the market is some value, E[θ̂ ]> 0.
Proposition 8 Let k ∈ (0.5, 1) and suppose buyers and sellers maximize (8) and (9), respectively. If beliefs, qj are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and security bias θ̂ j across
agents is uniformly distributed on [0, 1 − k], then equilibrium market level prices will be unbiased (p = q) even though all agents are systematically biased, with average bias E[θ̂ ] > 0.
Allowing for heterogeneity in both subjective probabilities and bias parameters, with q j
uniformly distributed over [0,1] and θj uniformly distributed over [k, 1], the market clearing
condition reduces to:
Z 1 Z 1+ p − 1
θ θ
k

(θ (1 − q) − (1 − p))dqdθ =

0

Z 1Z 1
k

p
θ

(θ q − p)dqdθ .

After integrating over subjective probabilities, the above condition becomes:
Z 1
(θ + p − 1)2
k

2θ

dθ =

Z 1
(θ − p)2
k

2θ

dθ .

(13)

This condition simplifies to:
−

(p − 1)2 ln k
p2 ln k
+ (p − 1)(1 − k) = −
− p(1 − k),
2
2

which further simplifies to p = 12 = q.
A subtle point related to Proposition 7 is that traders may revise their prior beliefs given
the information revealed by market prices to form posterior beliefs. We have implicitly assumed that traders have fixed beliefs (i.e., their prior and posterior probabilities are equal).
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We next provide a simple and plausible illustration that equilibrium prices can be the same
for prior and posterior beliefs, even if traders update their prior beliefs based on the information they extract from observing market prices. To distinguish prior and posterior
beliefs, we now denote the former by q and the latter by q(p). Consider a simple and
plausible belief-updating rule from Manski (2006) in which a trader’s posterior belief is a
weighted average of her prior belief and the observed market price. That is:
q(p) = λ q + (1 − λ )p,

(14)

where λ ∈ [0, 1]. Under this rule, prior beliefs are updated in the direction of the market price, with (1 − λ ) determining the degree to which beliefs are revised, including as
special cases no revision (λ = 1) and full revision (λ = 0). If prior beliefs are uniformly
distributed over [0, 1],then the distribution of posterior beliefs is uniform over the interval [(1 − λ )p, λ + (1 − λ )p] which is a subset of [0, 1]. Performing the same analysis as in
Proposition 7, assuming supply and demand are each positive, in equilibrium, the aggregate
quantity supplied is given by (15):
w
p(1 − p)

Z

p(1−θ (1−λ ))−(1−θ )
θλ

(1−λ )p

(θ (1 − p − λ (q − p)) − (1 − p))
dq
λ

(15)

The aggregate quantity demanded is given by (16):
w
p(1 − p)

Z λ +(1−λ )p
(θ (p + λ (q − p)) − p)
p(1−θ (1−λ ))
θλ

λ

dq

(16)

From setting supply equal to demand in equilibrium, we find that the equilibrium price
is the price p that solves the following equation:
(p(λ 2 − 1)θ + p + (θ − 1))2 = (p(λ 2 − 1)θ + p − λ 2 θ )2 .

(17)

Solving for p yields:
p=

1 − 2θ − λ 4 θ 2 + θ 2
1 2(1 − λ )p + λ
= =
= q.
4
2
2
2(1 − 2θ − λ θ + θ ) 2
2

(18)

Thus, even if agents use an updating rule that takes a weighted average of their prior
and the market price to form their posterior beliefs, the equilibrium price is the same as in
Proposition 7.
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7

Security Bias and Expectations-based Loss Aversion

One alternative model that has gained popularity in applications is the Koszegi-Rabin
model of reference-dependent preferences (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006; 2007). That model
can also explain loss aversion and the Allais paradox. The loss-aversion parameter, in the
Koszegi-Rabin model is consistent with rank dependent utility theory for values less than
2, but can violate stochastic dominance for values greater than 2. The model also makes the
strong assumption that agents have rational expectations regarding the reference point. In
contrast, QRD does not violate stochastic dominance and makes no assumptions regarding
rational expectations. Under QRD there is a natural reference point that is directly observable and well-specified for each lottery – the minimum outcome in the lottery’s support.
In addition to the results established for QRD in this paper, it has been shown that, QRD
can generate both a large equity premium and a low risk-free rate (Chateauneuf et al., 2007;
Zimper, 2012). In contrast, when the Koszegi-Rabin model is applied to generate a large
equity premium, it generates ‘counterfactually high volatility in the risk-free rate’ (Pagel,
2016). As a consequence, a different reference point must be chosen for prospect theory
applications in finance (e.g., Barberis et al., 2001), than for prospect theory applications in
other domains that employ the Koszegi-Rabin model.

8

Conclusion

We motivated quasi-rank dependent (QRD) utility theory as a modeling tool for studying
agents in markets in the presence of risk. The QRD model satisfies transitivity, stochastic
dominance, and risk aversion, and is simpler than leading probability weighting models
since it transforms individual rather than cumulative probabilities. In addition to explaining
experimental paradoxes for EU, we provided results that resolve several limitations of EU
when applied to real market contexts. In particular, the QRD model can simultaneously
explain four of the major empirical findings in applications that cannot be explained by EU:
(i) the optimality of purchasing full insurance at actuarially unfair prices; (ii) the limited
stock market participation puzzle; (iii) a large equity premium (Chateauneuf et al., 2007);
and (iv) the existence of buying and selling price gaps in markets (Dow and Werlang, 1992).
After demonstrating how the QRD model can explain (i) and (ii), we provided a bias
aggregation theorem which shows that there are cases where market prices may be unbiased
even if all traders are systematically biased. As the preceding results indicate, the QRD
model provides a useful tool for analyzing markets with systematically biased agents.
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Appendix: Proofs

Proposition 1. Let u(x) = x. Then loss aversion holds if and only if θ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof: Under the QRD model, loss aversion holds if and only if (1 − θ/2) >
(θ/2)

which holds if and only if

θ ∈ [0, 1). 

Proposition 2. The common ratio eect holds if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Note that for Denition 2, the QRD model implies:
f ∼ g ⇐⇒ u(y) = θ(pu(x ) + (1 − p)u(0)).
Given our normalization, u(0) = 0, that we noted at the beginning of Section
3, we have u(y) > 0 since y > 0 and u is strictly increasing. Hence, the above
indierence can hold only if θ > 0. Also,
f 0 ≺ g 0 ⇐⇒ θ(qu(y) + (1 − q)u(0)) < θ(qpu(x ) + (1 − qp)u(0)).
0
0
Note f ≺ g ⇐⇒ θu(y) < θ(pu(x ) + (1 − p)u(0)) = u(y).
This condition holds under QRD if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1). 

Proposition 3. The Allais paradox holds if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Note that for Denition 3, the QRD model implies:
f ∼ g ⇐⇒ u(y) = θ(pu(x ) + (1 − q)u(y) + (q − p)u(0)).
f 0 ≺ g 0 ⇐⇒ θ(qu(y) + (1 − q)u(0)) < θ(pu(x ) + (1 − p)u(0)).
0
0
Note f ≺ g ⇐⇒ θqu(y) < θ(pu(x ) + (q − p)u(0)).
Adding (1 − q )θu(y) to both sides yields:
θu(y) < θ(pu(x ) + (1 − q)u(y) + (q − p)u(0)) = u(y).
Since u(y) > 0, this inequality holds if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1). 

Proposition 4. For any θ ∈ (0, 1), and any concave u, a consumer with QRD
preferences will nd it optimal to purchase regular insurance at an actuarially
unfair price c > q if (6) holds:
1 − θ + θq ≥ c.

Proof:

(6)

As noted by Blavatskyy, under regular insurance, the decision maker

x < D, the decision maker loses cx dollars with probability 1 − q and loses D + x (c − 1)dollars
loses exactly

cD

dollars regardless of whether the loss occurs. If
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with probability

q.

Under the quasi-rank dependent model, the decision maker

will purchase regular insurance if and only if the following inequality holds for
any

x ∈ [0, D).
u(−cD) > θ(1 − q)u(−cx ) + (1 − θ + θq)u(−D − x (c − 1)).

The above inequality can be arranged as follows:

u(−cx) − u(−D − x(c − 1))
u(−cD) − u(−D − x(c − 1))
(1 − c) >
(1 − q)θ.
(D − x)(1 − c)
D−x

The fraction on the left-hand side of the above inequality is the slope of
the utility function between points

−cD

and

−D − x (c − 1),

and the fraction

on the right-hand side is the slope of the utility function between points
and

−D − x (c − 1).

For any strictly concave utility function

u,

−cx

the slope on

the left-hand side is always greater than the slope on the right hand side of
the inequality. Therefore, regular insurance will be optimal to purchase when

(1 − c)/(1 − q) ≥ θ.

This inequality can be rewritten as (6).



Proposition 5. For any θ ∈ (0, 1), and any concave u, there is always sufciently small  > 0 such that an investor with QRD preferences will nd it
optimal to not invest in a risky asset, R, with expected return E[R] =  and
minimum return rs < 0.
Proof: An agent with QRD preferences and wealth w , chooses an amount x
to invest in the asset in order to maximize the following value function:

V (R) = θ

X

qs u(w + xrs ) + (1 − θ)u(w + xrs ).

s∈S
The rst derivative of

V 0 (R) = θ

V (R)

X

with respect to

x

is:

qs u 0 (w + xrs )rs + (1 − θ)u 0 (w + xrs )rs .

s∈S
Consider the change in

V (R)

from investing
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x =0

to investing

x∗ > 0

in

asset

R.

In that case, computing the derivative at

x =0
#

"
u0 (w ) θ

yields:

X

qs rs + (1 − θ)rs

s∈S
Let

E[R]

denote the expected return on asset

pression becomes

R.

If

θ = 1,

the above ex-

0

u (w )E[R]. If E[R] > 0, then the above inequality implies the

classical result that an expected utility maximizer will always invest a positive

regardless of the agent's
E[R] = 0. Then it is clear that

amount in an asset with a positive expected return
degree of risk aversion. Next, let

θ

P

s∈S

qs rs + (1 − θ)rs < 0

θ<1

and let

as more weight is shifted to the lowest return. It

follows that for assets with suciently small but positive expected returns, a
QRD agent will choose not to invest in the asset.
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